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1 Introduction
India’s guaranteed public employment
programme (NREGP)1 is one of the largest social
protection programmes enacted in recent times,
and has attracted attention around the world for
its approach, content, design and
implementation mechanisms. The programme is
founded partly on economic considerations,
including the goal of full employment (Bhaduri
2005) and stimulation of demand during the
periods of economic contraction. It also
represents an effort to cushion the negative
effects of globalisation, especially through the
creation of wage employment and assets in rural
areas. From the perspective of a realpolitik it has
placed development at the centre of the
country’s grassroots democratic processes (IHD
2008). It is also viewed as a precursor to an
inclusive development paradigm (NCEUS 2009).
1.1 NREGS: programme features2
The NREG is based on the twin principles of
universality and self-selection. First, it offers the
legal right to work for those who demand it
within a timeframe (15 days of applying for
work) at a guaranteed minimum wage. Second,
the universal nature of the programme
eliminates targeting errors. The process of
implementation and community involvement (in
the form of planning of works and social audits)
is expected to reduce the corruption and
malpractice that were an important weakness of
earlier programmes.
Informed as it is by the basic elements of rights
and entitlements, the immediate objective of the
NREGS is to provide work that supports and
augments the income of needy households to
overcome deprivations. There are also
expectations that in the long term, it offers a
four-fold ‘transformational’ potential, through
‘multiplier accelerator synergy’, allowing
simultaneously for (1) ecological transformation;
(2) transformation of sustainable livelihoods;
(3) technological transformation, and most
importantly; (4) democratic transformation of
rural governance structures informed by the
notions of citizenship and entitlements (Shah
2009a). The implementation process of NREGS
is expected to unleash transformative potential
in both social relations and rural governance (see
also Shah 2009b,c), for example through works
such as the development of SC/ST households’
land.
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1.2 Methodology
Although NREG is a centrally sponsored
programme, its implementation is bound to differ
according to institutional contexts at the state
level. The choice of the three states: Rajasthan,
Bihar and Andhra Pradesh – was made in order to
capture these contextual differences in
implementation. Gram Panchayats (GP) are the
institutions which are entrusted with the
responsibility of implementation at village level.
Other civil society and public institutions are also
expected to play a supportive role. Although GPs
are not very effective in Rajasthan, there have
been active social mobilisation efforts, particularly
by civil society bodies such as agricultural labour
unions – Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan. The
assumption is that the presence of such
organisations promotes awareness among
labourers of the NREGA and its entitlements and
also institutional preparedness on the part of
implementing agencies. Furthermore, the state
has long experience in implementing public
works programmes as a part of drought relief.
In Andhra Pradesh too, the GPs are weak, but
proactive bureaucracy, grassroots mobilisation
through agencies such as self-help groups, the
innovative use of IT for monitoring and
mechanisms of transparency (social auditing) are
critical factors in the implementation of NREG.
In contrast to these two states, Bihar has neither
strong GPs nor civil society organisations known
for social mobilisation. These contrasting
institutional contexts were expected to help in
identifying critical factors in NREG’s
performance.
Based on the criterion of job creation which
reflects the higher and lower ends at all levels,
we decided to select two sample districts in each
state, two sample blocks in each district, and
eight sample panchayats in each block. In all, a
total of 1,443 worker households spread equally
across the three states were interviewed. Apart
from these, focus group discussions were held
with several groups of stakeholders, including
Panchayati Raj Institution (PRI) leaders, officials
at the panchayat, block and district levels.
Worksite observation also formed part of the
data gathering process.
This article is divided into four sections. The
second and third sections provide evidence on
the functioning of NREG from the perspective of
processes, entitlements and institutional factors.
The last section discusses policy implications of
the findings.
2 NREG process issues
2.1 NREG pre-work processes
Given that the vast majority of the labouring
poor have been exposed for the first time to
demand-based public works programmes as a
matter of right, the first step in implementation
is creating awareness of the programme, which is
followed by registering workers and providing
them with job cards. This is followed by
applications demanding work, which are
acknowledged by issuing dated receipts. This
entitles the workers to claim unemployment
allowance if work is not provided within 15 days.
Planning for, designing and allocating work are
the major pre-work processes. Although in the
initial period, the registration process was slow
in Bihar due to a lack of effective awareness-
creating institutions, the number of households
registering increased substantially later on. Also,
although job cards with photographs are
mandated to be issued free, about Rs20 (one-
quarter of a day’s wage under NREG) for each
card was collected as a bribe in Bihar. But such
instances of payment for getting a job card have
been rare in Andhra Pradesh and insignificant in
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Box 1 Mismatch between job cards given to households and actual persons working
Secondary data for scheme implementation in the financial year 2008–09 points to the fact
that out of the total households given job cards, only about 37 per cent of households in
Bihar were in fact provided employment under NREG. Similarly in Andhra Pradesh, the
proportion of households actually working among those that were issued job cards was 53
per cent, while in Rajasthan the proportion was about 75 per cent (www.nrega.nic.in).
Other households, according to officials, merely hoarded the job cards as security in
anticipation of receiving unemployment allowance. Since NREG is based on self-selection,
there is no restriction on the distribution of job cards. Several households without
members willing to do physical labour also acquired job cards in the hope of other benefits.
Thus, households with job cards always exceed households with actual participation.
Rajasthan. The present position is that there are
more households with job cards than people
actually seeking work and working (see Box 1).
This is because many households see the job card
itself as a kind of entitlement, which they hope
will help them in the future in case of any
reservations for economically weaker groups
(Pankaj and Tankha 2009).
2.2 Worker entitlements
Given the high level of illiteracy among work
seekers, the demand for work by ‘application’
takes an informal turn. Table 1 provides certain
basic facts about this informal process based on
the response of those who actually secured work.
The proportion ‘applying’ for work in Rajasthan
is high (91 per cent) followed by Andhra Pradesh
(71 per cent) but very low in Bihar (78 per cent).
Even in Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh, in most
of the cases of ‘applications’ are informal, and
are submitted via individual or collective
requests rather than written applications. The
formal ‘application’ takes the shape of filling out
the proforma once the work has been assigned.
The significance of this informality is partly due
to illiteracy of work seekers and partly because
the functionaries prefer to avoid paying
unemployment allowance in case of failure to
provide employment within 15 days of receiving
each formal application.
From the supply side, a lack of projects, delays in
the release of funds, lack of planning and the
unavailability of technical staff appear to be
some of the reasons for this situation. However,
no instances of workers’ claiming unemployment
allowance (an entitlement in the event of a
failure to provide jobs within 15 days) were found
in the field. These are certain process deficits in
this regard, with records of job requests and
acknowledgement of demand for work being very
poorly maintained by local authorities. Instances
of non-provision or undated receipts at the time
of demand for work were observed, suggesting
that officials at the local level have been
circumventing the provisions relating to
unemployment allowance. This brings to the fore
the issue that although NREG is a demand-
driven programme, its effectiveness in the
context of low literacy and poor awareness
depends upon the proactive provision of
continuous work through a group of well-
designed projects.
Another important aspect closely related to the
provision of work is related to entries on the job
cards of the workers regarding days worked and
wages due. It was found that in only about one-
quarter of the cases were there complete entries
made in the job card. Only partial entries were
made in job cards across the three states –
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Table 1 Application process related dimensions
Andhra Pradesh Bihar Rajasthan
‘Application’ mode
Yes 71 22 91
No 29 78 9
All 100 100 100
Kind of ‘application’*
Individual written application 1 31 28
Individual informal request 60 54 54
Collective written application 4 7 10
Collective informal request 35 7 8
All 100 100** 100
Receipt with date
Yes 16 4 21
No 84 93 77
Total 100 100** 100**
*Of those who ‘applied for’/‘requested’ work. **Do not add up to 100 – Some unclear cases.
Source IHD Survey (2009), pertaining to fieldwork conducted by IHD in April–July 2009. Fieldwork sample spanned
3 states – Andhra Pradesh, Bihar and Rajasthan, covering 2 districts in each state, 2 blocks in each district and
8 panchayats in each block. A total of 1,443 worker households were interviewed.
Andhra Pradesh in 32 per cent of cases, in Bihar
in about 22 per cent of cases and in Rajasthan in
about 66 per cent of cases (IHD 2009). Such a
situation seriously violates the entitlements of
workers and provides scope for corruption and
other malpractices, as workers are not then in a
position to contest any discrepancies in payments.
2.3 Worksite facilities and muster rolls
Under the NREG Act, it is mandated that
certain worksite facilities must be in place to
ensure proper conditions of work. These include
four basic facilities: drinking water, shade, first
aid kits and a crèche if there are six or more
women with children below the age of five years.
However, it was observed that the status of
worksite facilities was uniformly poor across the
three states studied. Almost none offered all
these facilities. Drinking water was provided in
some sites, shade in some places in Rajasthan
and Andhra Pradesh, first aid in some places in
Bihar and Andhra Pradesh, but there were
crèches at only very few of the worksites visited.
More surprising was that some of the basic
implements for digging and carrying earth, and
even vessels for drinking water were not provided
in Bihar. There appeared to be no institutional
mechanisms for accountability regarding these
worksite facilities, which suggests a need for the
development of benchmarks to ensure not only
employment but decent work.
One important feature that ensures
transparency is the muster roll (attendance
sheet) to be marked by the officially appointed
field worker and to be signed by the workers
(with a thumbprint in the case of the illiterate).
Ensuring proper maintenance of the muster roll
is an important function of the field worker, as it
forms the basis for the calculation of attendance
and wages. On this front, gaps are found in
Bihar, with only just over one-third of worksites
reporting the use of muster rolls. In the majority
of cases in this state (85 per cent), attendance is
taken in an informal notebook, ‘kachcha khata’.
Also in both Bihar and Rajasthan, nearly half the
sample workers did not sign the muster rolls at all and in
the majority of cases these rolls were not kept up to date.
These deficiencies deny transparency and create
room for tampering.
2.4 Outreach and employment created
An important indicator of the programme
performance is the number of days of
employment provided to a household (Table 2).
Rajasthan enjoyed the highest number of person
days of employment per household (76 days),
followed by Andhra Pradesh (74). Bihar records
the lowest number of days (24). Rajasthan and
Andhra Pradesh also show that a majority of
households (58 per cent and 53 per cent,
respectively) get 75–100 days of employment.
An initial analysis of the sampled worker
households confirms the scope of NREG as a
social protection programme, reaching the most
needy economic and social groups of the country.
Those coming from landless or marginal farmer
families, engaging in casual labour, belonging to
economic groups below the poverty line
(possessing a BPL card or card for the poorest),
and hailing from the most deprived social groups
(scheduled caste and scheduled tribes) constitute
the majority of NREG workers (Table 2). These
characteristics3 impose enormous responsibility
on the implementing apparatus in terms of
ensuring effective delivery. However, these very
characteristics of the participating households
may also create the conditions for misuse and
neglect of processes, and therefore call for
effective institutional and governance structures.
In Rajasthan, female participation in the scheme
is much higher than male. This is due to out-
migration by male members of the household,
seeking higher wages and a longer duration of
continuous work which NREG is not able to
provide. In Andhra Pradesh, the relatively higher
participation of women in NREGS is partly due to
NREG wages being higher than market wages for
women and partly because market wages for men
in some agriculturally better-off pockets being
higher than NREG wages. There are also
instances where men prefer to migrate not only
for higher wages but also for longer duration of
work. NREG work is often in the nature of
sporadic and short duration. Bihar, the reason for
low participation of women in NREGS is not only
the need to attend to domestic chores (59 per cent
of respondents) but also severe cultural
inhibitions on women’s wage work among several
castes. In Rajasthan, although women’s
participation is high, it would be more if adequate
child care facilities at the worksite are provided.
There are several factors that contribute to the
provision of employment upon demand.
Receiving administrative and technical
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sanctions, planning, fund release, weather
conditions, and agricultural seasons play an
important role in number of days of employment
created. Often there appears to be mismatch
between employment need and availability, a
mismatch that would also affect overall
participation rates. Workers’ preference in all
regions is for longer duration of work without too
many breaks. But in reality, shorter duration and
frequent breaks are usual and both discourage
participation and encourage migration seeking
continuous work for longer period.
2.5 Wage determination and level of wages
One of the important dimensions of right to
employment is that workers are entitled to
payment of wages commensurate to the
minimum wages of the relevant states. Wages
are to be paid within 15 days of completion of
work, failing which the officials concerned are
liable for punishment.
In all states except Himachal Pradesh, wage
payments are supposed to be made on the basis
of a piece rate linked to the ‘Schedule of Rates’
converted to a minimum wage rate.
While almost all respondents reported that wage
payment was made on the basis of work
measurement in Andhra Pradesh and Rajasthan,
in Bihar about half the respondents said they
were paid a daily rate which implies that work
measurements are not taken seriously. Also,
while in Andhra Pradesh and Rajasthan, workers
reported having seen officials measuring work, in
Bihar, 17 per cent of households reported that
they had not seen officials doing so. This
discrepancy exposes a lack of knowledge among
workers about the basis of their wages, and also
approximations and deficiencies in measuring of
work by technical staff, who in turn complain of
inadequate staffing (Box 2).
Issues of division of work at worksites, work
output and work measurement and the payment
of corresponding wages for the work done needs
greater clarity, as was especially brought to the
fore in Rajasthan. For instance, time-motion-and-
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Table 2 Employment created and share of employment by social and economic categories
Andhra Pradesh Bihar Rajasthan
Average no. of days of employment per household 74 24 76
Share of employment by social and economic categories (%)
Social group
SC 45 69 33
ST 5 7 23
OBC 35 23 35
Others 15 0 10
Gender
Male 49 71 28
Female 51 29 72
Economic status (ration card type)
Above poverty line 3 11 49
Below poverty line 89 40 35
Antyodaya card (very poor) 7 36 11
Annapoorna card (destitute/old age) 0 1 1
Others 1 12 4
Land category
Landless 22 80 20
Marginal 48 19.50 67
Small 24 0.41 9
Medium 5 0 3
Large 0 0 1
Source IHD Survey (2009), pertaining to fieldwork conducted by IHD in April–July 2009. Fieldwork sample spanned
3 states – Andhra Pradesh, Bihar and Rajasthan, covering 2 districts in each state, 2 blocks in each district and
8 panchayats in each block. A total of 1,443 worker households were interviewed.
work studies conducted in Andhra Pradesh found
that labourers had to work almost three times
longer under the standard Schedule of Rates
(SOR) to get the basic minimum wage, owing to
the observed difference between the wage
promised and the actual wage received by the
worker under the task rate formula (CSE 2008:
33–5). Based on the recommendations of this
study, the Andhra Pradesh government issued
orders in April 2007 modifying the wage
entitlements of workers in various NREGA works.
In October 2008, Bihar too adopted a new
schedule of rates based on time and motion
studies which was considered to be more gender-
friendly. But in practice, there have been several
approximations made undoing the considerations
of productivity norms. Considerable delays in the
payment of wages in Rajasthan are attributable
to measurement delays.
As a result, the effectiveness of the piece-rate
method is being reconsidered, and suggestions
have been made to de-link wages from output and
instead, to pay daily wages in order to simplify
processes. Links between the mode and frequency
of wage payment also need to be explored to
minimise delays in payment to NREG workers and,
depending on the handling capacities of banks
and post offices, these institutions may be seen as
a pivotal mechanisms in reducing such delays.
In all the three states studied, NREG minimum
wages for women are higher than rural
agricultural and non-agricultural market wages.
In Bihar and Rajasthan NREG minimum wages
for male workers are also higher than prevailing
market wages in agriculture. However, in
Rajasthan non-agricultural market wages in
urban areas are higher. In Andhra Pradesh, in
many agriculturally prosperous districts, male
agricultural market wages are higher than the
NREG minimum wages. These wage differences
also influence the extent of male and female
participation in NREG employment.
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Box 2 Wage determination and work measurement issues in group-based work
A peculiar problem was observed in Rajasthan. Usually large numbers of workers were
present at worksites, up to 50–70 persons, and they were further divided into teams to
undertake tasks (see also Khera 2008). Gender and caste-related issues surfaced in some
cases. It was found that only some members of the group worked, while others shirked,
assuming they would be paid anyway. As a result of this, we found 70-year-olds and even
some college students at the worksite during their summer holidays, not undertaking work
but merely hanging around. In Tonk district, we found some people playing cards at the
worksite. Moreover, members of dominant communities such as Gujjar and Jat did not
work, but threatened associates and officials to mark their attendance so that they could
claim wages.
But there is also evidence to the contrary. In Andhra Pradesh there were three instances
where weak, elderly and female workers were allowed lighter tasks. Lactating mothers
were also allowed to break in order to breastfeed. In these cases, wages were shared
equally by consensus among the groups.
However, there were also cases where male labourers in a mixed group did not work hard,
making women do much of the work, and leading to female labourers preferring to work
without men in their groups. The programme officer in charge of NREGA in Tonk District
mentioned that they were experimenting by trying to make separate groups for males and
females, but often this too was not preferred.
One of the reasons for low daily wages in Rajasthan is crowding at worksites. In one
instance in Nadri Panchayat of Tonk District, an area with hard soil and rock, after the
division of wages among workers, only Rs1 per day accrued to each of them due to the large
number of workers, suboptimal work output and the outdated schedule of rates (SOR),
specifying the amount of work to be completed to earn minimum wages. On the contrary,
in another village where the numbers of ‘sitting’ labourers were few in number, wages were
above Rs80.
2.6 Process of work selection, planning and type of
NREG works
It can be seen that most works undertaken in
Andhra Pradesh were land development works
(45 per cent), with other works (29 per cent).4 In
Bihar, most are rural road connectivity works
(65 per cent), while a few involve the renovation
of traditional water bodies and irrigation works
(Table 3). In Rajasthan similarly, most involve
rural road works. Some renovation of traditional
water bodies was also being undertaken, mostly
in Tonk, Rajasthan.
The process of selection of works is meant to be
participatory and the works selected should reflect
local development needs. The process involves
Gram Sabha meetings in which members of the
village community assemble to discuss and select
the nature and location of works to be undertaken
under NREG. Although different local level actors
were reported to be present at the time of
selection of works, suggestions from people as to
what works to be taken up were not listened to,
and it largely emerges that scheme selection
ultimately comes ‘from above’, usually drawn from
a previously used, ready-made shelf of works,
resulting in ad hoc scheme selection. Further, a
disturbing feature of some works in Rajasthan was
the violation of the guidelines that labour cost
should be at least 60 per cent of the project cost
and the material cost should not exceed 40 per
cent. In most of the works, the material cost was
in the range of 60–80 per cent. It is observed as a
deliberate ploy to misappropriate by inflating the
procured material cost.
The allocation of funds for NREG consists of
three levels of works: at least 50 per cent of the
funds are to be used by Gram Panchayat (taking up
village level works), 30 per cent by Panchayat
Samiti (taking up inter-Panchayat works) and the
remaining 20 per cent by Zila Parishad (taking up
inter-block works). A slew of administrative
sanctions and technical sanctions are also needed
for the works to be passed, with the works
employing a greater amount of funds needing
sanction from correspondingly higher local level
authorities. However, it was often found that
proposals for some of these larger works
languished in the offices of the higher level
functionaries, awaiting their sanction, thereby
delaying their commencement.
Effective planning of works is an important
prerequisite for the quality of assets created
through NREG. The shelf of projects may be
expanded and works need to be prioritised, based
on need rather than the limits of the
implementing structures. The current approach
of having limits to sanction works at various
levels of the panchayat raj structure appears to be
negatively affecting the quality of assets.
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Table 3 Nature of NREGS works undertaken (% share of each type)
Type of work Andhra Pradesh Bihar Rajasthan
Water conservation 11 0 0
Drought proofing – 3 2
Irrigation works – 7 3
Irrigation on individual land 15 0 3
Renovation of traditional water bodies – 10 30
Land development 45 3 2
Flood control – 10 0
Rural connectivity – 65 57
Other works* 29 2 3
Total 100 100 100
*Other works include silt application, percolation tanks, earthen bunding, etc.
Source IHD Survey (2009), pertaining to fieldwork conducted by IHD in April–July 2009. Fieldwork sample spanned
3 states – Andhra Pradesh, Bihar and Rajasthan, covering 2 districts in each state, 2 blocks in each district and
8 panchayats in each block. A total of 1,443 worker households were interviewed. 
Bureaucratic hurdles in sanctions also need to be
addressed. The development of lands belonging
to scheduled castes and scheduled tribe
households and other households below the
poverty line appears to have tremendous
potential in unleashing productive capacities in
rural areas, wherein hitherto non-arable lands
can come into cultivation, as the study found in
Andhra Pradesh. Such works would also trigger a
multiplier effect. It is imperative to identify and
prioritise such works through a process of
village-level resource planning. Mechanisms for
the equitable benefit-sharing of assets also need
to be developed, especially in cases such as land
and water-related works, where in the post-
construction phase, benefits often accrue to
landowners rather than the landless.
2.7 Grievance redress mechanisms and accountability
provisions
Grievance redress mechanisms remain
conspicuous by their absence at the district and
sub-district levels, and through discussions with
the NREG workers it emerged that this proves
very costly for them, as they remain powerless in
exposing scheme irregularities. Often, as was
reported in numerous cases in Bihar, workers are
at the mercy of locally powerful groups or actors,
also in charge of scheme implementation
(sometimes by misappropriation), who are able
to manipulate scheme benefits to their gain.
They interfered at the time of wage payment and
siphoned cuts from the wages due to the workers.
However, the NREG workers could not turn to an
independent third party to expose this
infringement of the programme’s rules. A recent
amendment in the NREG Act has been made to
rectify this situation, by providing a district
ombudsman to look into NREG-related
complaints.
In fact, other accountability mechanisms are
built into the NREG programme such as social
audits (Box 3); the demand for proactive
disclosure of NREG-related documents through
display boards or using the Right to Information
Act; and public scrutiny of accounts, vigilance
and monitoring committees to oversee the
quality of implementation of the scheme, existed
in theory but not in practice, except in Andhra
Pradesh.
Punitive actions for addressing deficits in
entitlements may need to be established in
earnest. Such measures will enhance transparency
as well as responsiveness among officials to check
incomplete entries in job cards, measurement
delays and delays in payment, which need to be
purged. Additionally, instituting of a grievance
redress agency or actor, independent of scheme
stakeholders, would help in ensuring
transparency. The establishment of district
ombudsmen is a step in this direction. Social audit
mechanisms, as instituted in Andhra Pradesh, can
be replicated in other states, although attention is
needed to ensure that such an exercise is adapted
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Box 3 Accountability through social audit in Andhra Pradesh
In Andhra Pradesh, social audits have been instituted through a state-led initiative, and
are conducted by an independent group – the Society for Social Audit, Accountability and
Transparency (SSAAT), Department of Rural Development, Government of Andhra
Pradesh. Social audits, as designed in the NREG, are intended to serve as a platform for
the redress of grievances. The audit exercise involves public hearings which act as a forum
for exposing discrepancies in government records of programme implementation. This
occurs through the testimonies of workers and opportunities given to officials to publicly
defend their actions (Aiyar and Samji 2009). As part of the social audit, state and district
resource persons train village social auditors, who in turn are involved in monitoring and
evaluating scheme processes. They also play a key role in raising awareness of beneficiaries
through discussions and dialogue about the NREG programme and its provisions. The
social audit as conducted in Andhra Pradesh has developed into a best practice in terms of
public accountability, serving as a model to be replicated in all states. Audits have been
conducted in 7,000 households in all 22 districts of the state, with the involvement of more
than 150 NGOs and civil society organisations. As a result, there have been a number of
instances of corrective action such as initiation of departmental enquiries, dismissal of
erring officials due to malpractice and voluntary recovery of up to Rs30 million from
NREG-related misdeeds (Rajsekhar 2009).
to local contexts, so that NREG workers can voice
their grievances without fear.
3 Institutions and governance in NREG
implementation
3.1 Awareness creation through NGOs and local level
initiatives
While government functionaries recruited
especially for the implementation of the NREG
are expected to deliver their services, there is a
host of other agencies involved at various stages
of implementation. As a rights-based
programme, NREG envisages certain
prerequisites in terms of enhanced awareness
and understanding of the nuances of rights and
entitlements and the processes of their
realisation. At this juncture, there still appears
to be much scope for creating awareness
systematically among all the stakeholders.
Information dissemination about the Act, its
provisions and entitlements, is necessary and
appropriate processes are needed to ensure
messages reach workers as well as implementing
officials, Panchayat leaders and other important
stakeholders. The Right to Information (RTI)
has been invoked in some instances in Rajasthan
and Andhra Pradesh as a corrective instrument
to check corruption, where through demand for
proactive disclosure of NREG-related documents
by workers, leakages have been exposed.
Awareness of NREGA and its entitlements was
created in Tonk District of Rajasthan by an NGO
from Jaipur. Puppetry was used to communicate
with workers about their rights and the details of
the employment programme. In Udaipur, focus
group discussions revealed that ‘role-playing’ as
a method was also used to create familiarity
among prospective workers, with the specifics of
the scheme.
In Bihar, the role of NGOs and self-help groups
(SHGs) in awareness creation about the
programme is an exception. However, officials in
the village of Dobhi, Gaya district, reported that
the Gautam Budh NGO is creating awareness
about NREGS, as is Jeevika, an SHG, in two or
three villages of Purnia district. Additionally,
villagers in Neema in Gaya district claimed that
the local cadre of CPI (ML) was creating
awareness among its members, who are now well
informed about the NREGS. Few local officials
said that mahila samitis (women’s groups) were
creating awareness among women.
Women’s SHGs facilitated by the Indira Kranti
Patham (IKP), a government-led poverty
reduction and women’s empowerment
programme in Andhra Pradesh, play an
important role in NREGS. SHG members and
leaders and the cadre of community workers
facilitate awareness, job card access and the
work application process. Leaders of federations
of SHGs at the Panchayat and Mandal levels and
field workers also play important roles in
facilitating payment transactions and social
audits. Recently, a Memorandum of
Understanding (MoU) was signed between the
Department of Rural Development and a
network of 13 NGOs in Anantapur district of
Andhra Pradesh to facilitate the development of
degraded common lands under NREG.
Thus, social mobilisation at the grassroots level
appears to be a sine qua non for the effective
realisation of rights. It was also found that
wherever civil society agencies played the role of
facilitators, there were more effective processes
in place.
3.2 Gram Sabhas
The Gram Sabha of the village Panchayat is an
important element in NREG’s functioning. The
Gram Sabha is meant to be instrumental in the
planning of local need-based works under NREGS.
Across the three states, about 44 per cent of
respondents said that NREGS in particular was
discussed in Gram Sabha meetings, although in
Rajasthan this figure was small. Furthermore, as
to whether NREGS works were selected at the
Gram Sabha meetings, overall 40 per cent of
respondents said that this did occur, again more so
in Andhra Pradesh and Bihar than in Rajasthan.
The attendance and representation of different
groups at the Gram Sabha also determines, to
some extent, the types of assets that will be
created, and in turn who will benefit most from
that asset creation. For instance, most women in
Bihar reported that they did not participate in
the Gram Sabha as they did not understand much
of what happened there. What is lacking is the
comprehension of the overall role of the
programme, which can only come through proper
social mobilisation. Also, while the role of Gram
Sabhas is envisaged at the time of social audit, it
was observed that this was often not the case,
with audits necessarily being driven by either
‘top-down’ or ‘bottom-up’ pressures.
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3.3 System of monitoring of NREG works
A web enabled monitoring and information
system (MIS) has been initiated
(www.nrega.nic.in) in order to track the entire
NREG implementation process, with the aim of
inducing transparency by placing all relevant
programme related information in the public
domain.
Andhra Pradesh has taken this initiative a step
further. While all other states have MIS
developed by the National Informatics
Corporation (NIC), Andhra Pradesh developed
its MIS to suit the state’s specific needs with the
help of Tata Consultancy Services (TCS). This is
modelled in a manner such that each mandal
office has a client–server system, where all data
and work/wage related entry is done by a
computer operator. The system provides details
regarding registration of wage-seekers,
management of shelf of works, work progress,
monitoring and payment, management of funds
and shares reports and analysis. All the data from
the blocks is later integrated at the state level.
Each step in the implementation of the NREG is
computerised, and data is updated on a daily
basis, thereby allowing for ‘real-time’ monitoring,
rather than aggregating data gathered over a
period of a month as in the national MIS, which
results in time lags and not being able to resolve
problems as they arise. This allows for special
mechanisms that flag anomalies such as workers
without bank accounts and wage delays, and also
automatically generates pay slips to workers for
wage payment (Ngo 2010). The software has been
designed to be worker-centric and offers the use
of images and voice recognition to reach out to
illiterate workers wanting to know their work and
wage status.
In other states, however, filling in the MIS
datasheets has proven difficult, in part owing to
the lack of awareness of NREG functionaries of
the practice, lack of personnel to conduct data
entry, infrequent access to the internet at the
block level for uploading the relevant
information and yearly changes in formats. For
instance, in Bihar, these detailed records are
available only for the financial year 2008–09,
although programme implementation has been
ongoing in some districts since 2006.
Taking the example of Andhra Pradesh, the use
of Information and Communication Technologies
(ICTs) at various stages of NREG may be
considered, for example in the identification of
NREG workers and keeping records of their
payments. Biometrics for attendance (as noted
earlier), smart cards, handheld devices,
electronic payments and appropriate tracking
software represent steps in this direction, so that
the need is to identify replicable processes for
different institutional contexts.
3.4 NREG functionaries
At the three levels of local government
representation – the district, the block and the
panchayat, there are supposed to be dedicated
NREG personnel, i.e. a District Programme
Coordinator, a Block Programme Officer and a
Panchayat Rozgar Sewak. These officials are
responsible for the implementation of the
programme at different levels. However, their
abilities and effectiveness in delivering on their roles and
responsibilities are crippled by inadequate staffing, ad
hoc positions without any career prospects, poor salaries,
a heavy workload and the absence of transport facilities
or allowances (Box 4).
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Box 4 Grievances of NREG functionaries
Interviews in Bihar revealed the following:
z At the Panchayat level in particular, Rozgar Sewaks received a consolidated salary of
Rs3,000 per month, nearly a subsistence wage. Further, salaries for NREG personnel
were often delayed by 3–6 months.
z Understaffing of functionaries at each level meant that they were often given additional
charge of blocks or panchayats beyond their designated ones.
z Despite being appointed specifically for the NREG, officials complained of being
burdened with non-NREG work such as preparing BPL lists and serving during election
duty, resulting in less attention to NREG work.
z No travel allowance or transport facility was provided to them, despite their having to
oversee multiple worksites, for which they had to cover their own expenses.
Lapses or delays on the part of the Junior
Technical Engineers and Assistants in visiting
worksites to chart and account for the work done
by the labourers were found to translate into
subsequent delays in the payment of wages to
the workers. Problems also arose from the
appointment process. For instance, the ‘mate’ at
the village level in Rajasthan was often an
appointment determined by the pressure of
politically influential people, and it was reported
that in many instances, corruption was mainly
generated by these mates, who were connected
with ‘muscle’ men.
Considerable time is spent by staff at the field
level on procedures which need to be simplified.
Technical support for field functionaries and
panchayat representatives on the planning and
monitoring of works is another important need at
the field level. The absence of this support
appears to be leading to suboptimal results as far
as quality of works is concerned. Since 6 per cent
of the expenditure could be used for
administrative and capacity-building purposes,
resources may not be a constraint. Furthermore,
the shortage of technical staff, their workload,
multiple responsibilities of staff, training, delays
in appointments and incentive structures are
some of the human resource issues that need
immediate attention, as was particularly observed
from the lacunae in scheme implementation in
all the states, and more so in Bihar.
3.5 Payment agencies
Separation of the function of wage payment from
the NREG implementing agencies was conceived
as a measure to avoid the misappropriation of
wage payments. Almost all households surveyed
in Andhra Pradesh and Rajasthan had individual
post office or bank accounts through which they
were paid NREGS wages. However, in Bihar, only
a little more than half (52 per cent) of workers
have bank accounts, indicating that payment of
wages through bank or post office accounts has
not yet been institutionalised. In these cases,
payment in the form of daily wages was made in
cash by the work supervisor who could be a ward
member, rozgar sewak or the mukhiya of the
Panchayat. Cash payment of daily wages is also
preferred by the workers in need, but they do
report underpayment and manipulations.
Workers often fail to report these and instead,
connive with the functionaries, who make excess
entries of work on the job cards, often with the
knowledge of the workers, and pocket the wages
for those additional work entries. But workers’
preference is for payment through the post office
or a bank, if it is done within a week.
In Bihar, suggestions are made in favour of post
office accounts over bank accounts for wage
payments since most panchayats already have post
offices, but not bank branches in their locality.
There is also the fact, as observed in Gaya, that
banks are not active within the NREG as they do
not like to operate zero balance accounts,
without receiving any commercial gain. However,
it was observed in Bihar that wage payments
even by post offices was fraught with some
difficulties due to shortages in staff to handle the
bulk of NREG payments, limited hours of
operation and their having to handle other social
welfare scheme-related payments, such as
widows’ pensions and housing assistance through
Indira Awas Yojana (IAY) disbursements.
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Box 5 Cutting leakages – wage payment using ICT and biometric smart cards
An innovative feature of the NREG programme in Andhra Pradesh is wage payment
through banks and post offices, with the use of ICT and transaction-based Monitoring and
Information Systems (MIS). A strict payment cycle is supposed to be followed, with work
measurement being completed by day 6, after which preparation of cheques, the transfer
of cash, and the final disbursement to post offices occurs by day 13, well within the
stipulated 15 days for payment of wages.
Further, after a recent pilot study testing its efficiency, Financial Information Network and
Operations Ltd (FINO), a technology solutions provider, is paying wages to NREGS
workers through biometric smart cards (using fingerprint authentication) in 259 villages in
five districts of Andhra Pradesh (93 in Karimnagar; 17 in Medak; 53 in Chittoor; 55 in East
Godavari and 41 in Mahaboobnagar). This is aimed at reducing transaction time as well as
costs to workers and also enabling transparent payments.
The gap between the completion of work and
payment of wages is a critical factor. The gap has
been reduced substantially in Andhra Pradesh, to
less than two weeks in most cases, by improved
methods of IT for uplinking the logging work
done and the introduction of biometric smart
cards for payment (Box 5). In Rajasthan, there
were immense delays in wage payments, with on
average a 2-month delay (62 days) between work
completion and wage payment. Moreover, in each
district, almost three-quarters of the respondents
reported more than a month’s delay in receiving
wages. Besides delays in opening accounts in the
post office, where the service was very poor due to
the shortage of staff and other requirements for
account opening such as stationery and forms,
delays in work measurements and dispatching
the same to the block level are also cited as
reasons for the undue gap. Additionally, in
Hathela village of Tonk district, it was reported
that the postmaster knowingly delayed the NREG
payment and demanded money. Payment through
‘minibanks’ was found to be somewhat more
effective in Rajasthan.
3.6 Developing an employment calendar
While NREG is a rights-based demand-driven
programme, at the operational level the demand is
influenced by the seasonality of agriculture’s
demand for labour. As a social protection
programme, it is expected to meet the
employment requirement of workers during the
slack season of employment. If NREG work could
meet the slack season demand, it is considered to
be not only optimal but also one that avoids clash
with agricultural demand for labour. Thus, there is
a need to develop an NREGP calendar of works. In
an exercise conducted by the Centre for
Environment Concerns (CEC), an NGO in Andhra
Pradesh, farmers and NREG workers were brought
together to devise an agricultural employment
calendar, resulting in the identification of a shelf of
works, wherein small projects could be taken up
any time during the year and large ones with high
employment potential were slated only during the
non-peak agricultural season (CEC 2009: 63–8).
Such a calendar is being implemented in Andhra
Pradesh and a similar approach may also be
adopted by other states. Given that NREGP wages
are on a par with wages in agriculture, such a
seasonal calendar is expected to ensure continuous
employment throughout the year for workers.
Additionally, the domino effect of minimum wages
offered under NREGA on agricultural wages has
been welcomed for establishing a much needed
wage floor for rural labour.
4 Reflections and implications for policy
4.1 NREGP as social protection
First and foremost, our field research informs
and reconfirms the basic assumption that as a
social protection programme, NREGP is able to
reach the vulnerable groups as reflected in the
share of employment of scheduled caste,
scheduled tribes, BPL households and women.
Households have also indicated reduced hunger
periods and improved incomes through the
NREG programme, although they are not
certain about any reduction in migration. All
these point towards the view that as a social
protection programme, NREGP is able to
address some vulnerabilities and transfer
incomes to poor households. Evidence also points
out that reaching such groups in a sustainable
way would also require institutional structures
that deliver these benefits effectively. Since the
transformation of grassroots governance
structures is one of the overarching objectives,
such a situation would emerge only when there
are processes that facilitate such a
transformation. It is in this context that
strengthening village-level democratic structures
such as Gram Sabha and the village Panchayat,
involvement of self-help groups and other
autonomous collectives becomes imperative.
Such processes require not only commitment of
resources but also substantial attention to design
aspects of NREG.
4.2 Process and institutional improvements
Although it was envisaged as a rights-based and
demand-driven programme that is universal and
self-selecting in terms of participation, the
implementation of NREG, however, runs the risk
of ending up like many other bureaucracy-driven
public employment programmes that have been
in place for many years in India. To avoid this,
attention should be paid to the weaknesses of
Panchayati Raj institutions at the grassroots
level, which need strengthening through the
provision of adequate supporting staff, capacity-
building of both elected representatives and
supporting institutions and technical assistance
in preparing design of works for resource
development from the village level and upwards.
In the immediate future, the experience of
Andhra Pradesh and Rajasthan suggest that
involvement of civil society organisations, and
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proactive initiatives towards helping workers to
be organised into groups to enable them with
effective participation may be necessary.
Although certain pre-work processes need to be
streamlined, the past experience of four years
has enabled an outreach to the poor in terms of
the registering and issuing of job cards. There
are hardly any complaints of the exclusion of
poor households from job cards, although there
are instances of cards being given to the
household instead of each individual worker. The
demand for work through proper application
could be improved by organising the workers into
groups with the help of civil society
organisations. Still, the demand for work would
increase with proactive initiatives on the supply
side by creating a shelf of projects and
publicising the availability of work continuously,
so that the workers are assured that NREG work
is not of short duration and sporadic in nature –
the reasons for relatively low demand in many
instances. Regarding the worksite facilities, the
basic problem appears to be insensitivity of
functionaries, rather than resource constraints.
Here again, proactive action by programme
agencies in, e.g. supplying the right type of
vessels for drinking water; budgeting in work for
a person to supply water; supply and insistence
on the use of first aid boxes and shelter sheets at
the worksite, should be made compulsory.
While there are deficiencies in some
entitlements, the most important successful one
has been the provision of at least 75–100 days of
work, as promised, to at least half of the
participating households in Andhra Pradesh and
Rajasthan (although Bihar still remains nowhere
near this achievement). In most cases, the
payment of statutory minimum wages is also
occurring (with the exception of delays in
Rajasthan), and wages are reaching those
workers who have worked under NREG. Systems
related to this aspect of the programme still have
teething problems, especially in Bihar, in terms
of inadequate capacities of banks and post
offices, although there is gradual movement
towards post offices or banks in most of the
cases. The Andhra Pradesh experience of
biometric smart cards for payment is translated
into a technology that can be adopted
everywhere. Besides reducing delays, it also
eliminated scope for impersonation. Another
important measure that is adopted by Andhra
Pradesh is the computerised uplinking of muster
rolls data on days of work done and the wages
due within three days of its completion. Adoption
of this system would considerably reduce delays
in payment of wages.
The other important aspect of the programme is
the type and quality of works created and their
contribution to the rural economy. While
feedback is positive overall regarding the types of
works, there appears to be little focus on the
quality of assets due to inadequate technical
capacities at the field level in terms of providing
design and technical inputs while executing the
works. Interactions with the field functionaries
revealed this critical gap. Furthermore,
consensus-based decision-making regarding the
selection of assets to reflect local development
has a long way to go. While it has undoubtedly
emerged that the NREG has served the function
of an ‘employer of last resort’, acting as an
‘automatic stabiliser’ with the demand-based
nature of work cushioning the adverse impacts,
the verdict is still inconclusive as to its long-term
potential for promoting secure and sustainable
rural livelihoods.
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Notes
1 The acronyms NREG, NREGS, NREGP are
used interchangeably in the literature, all
meaning the National Rural Employment
Guarantee Programme. We use NREG
referring to the Scheme. It has been renamed
recently as Mahatma Gandhi National Rural
Employment Guarantee (MGNREGA). The
programme came into existence through the
National Rural Employment Guarantee Act
(NREGA) of Parliament in February, 2006. In
Phase I it was introduced in 200 of the most
backward districts of the country, and an
additional 130 districts were included in Phase
II, in 2007–2008. The Scheme was further
extended to all the remaining rural districts
of India from 1 April 2008.
2 For further elaboration, see IHD (2009a,b).
3 National level secondary data also reflect
similar features vis-a-vis participants of the
NREG programme.
4 Others include silt application, percolation
tanks, earthen bunding, etc.
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